California Chief Justice on Bumble Bees as Fish (and Statutory Interpretation Extra Broadly)

Our denial of a petition for evaluation doesn’t talk any specific view relating to the deserves of the problems offered within the petition. Thus, all ought to perceive that our resolution to disclaim evaluation on this case will not be an endorsement (neither is it a rejection) of the statutory evaluation undertaken by the Court docket of Attraction, which decided that bumble bees, a nonaquatic invertebrate, are inclined to being listed as endangered underneath the California Endangered Species Act (Fish & G. Code, § 2050 et seq.; CESA) as a result of that statute applies to fish (Fish & G. Code, §§ 2062, 2067 & 2068), and “invertebrates” are included inside what the Court docket of Attraction deemed to be the relevant definition of “fish” (id., § 45) [“Fish” means a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate, amphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals -EV]. (Almond Alliance of California v. Fish & Recreation Com. (2022) 79 Cal.App.fifth 337, 341.)

But if expertise is any information, our resolution to not order evaluation might be misconstrued by some as an affirmative dedication by this courtroom that underneath the legislation, bumble bees are fish. A greater-informed observer would possibly ask: How can the courtroom go up this chance to evaluation the Court docket of Attraction’s interpretation of the Fish and Recreation Code, which appears so opposite to widespread information that bumble bees aren’t a sort of fish? Would not this clear disconnect essentially quantity to “an necessary query of legislation” (Cal. Guidelines of Court docket, rule 8.500(b)(1)) warranting this courtroom’s intervention, as a result of the Legislature couldn’t presumably have meant such a outcome?

Had been issues at all times that easy. Cautious evaluation of a statute to divine legislative intent can typically yield outcomes which may appear shocking at first blush. Courts engaged on this process have interpreted “much less” as “extra” (Amalgamated Trans. Loc. 1309 v. Laidlaw Tran. Ser. (ninth Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1140, 1146) and “illegal” as “lawful” (Scurto v. LeBlanc (La. 1938) 184 So. 567, 574). Way back, the USA Supreme Court docket concluded that the “seas” referenced in a single statute required no water in any respect (Murray’s Lessee v. Baker (1818) 16 U.S. 541, 545); fairly not too long ago, it decided {that a} fish will not be a “tangible object” (United States v. Yates (2015) 574 U.S. 528, 536).

These sorts of seemingly illogical outcomes can the truth is greatest seize the enacting legislature’s intent in quite a lot of circumstances. A statute could also be construed in a way that goes past the literal which means of its textual content to keep away from an absurd outcome the legislature couldn’t presumably have contemplated. Generally courts understand a scrivener’s error or typo that have to be corrected to vindicate the intent behind a measure. Or the context surrounding the usage of a phrase or phrase inside a statute can convey that it carries an uncommon which means, peculiar to that legislation. The Court docket of Attraction under concluded that the interpretive query earlier than it fell into the final of those classes, with the consequence that bumble bees ought to certainly be thought to be “fish” underneath the CESA.

Even when the Court docket of Attraction arrived at what would possibly superficially appear to be a counterintuitive outcome, that alone doesn’t set up that it erred. Furthermore, our resolution to not order evaluation right here doesn’t forestall us from contemplating the CESA’s attain in some future case, at which era we could agree or disagree with the Court docket of Attraction’s evaluation. Within the interim, the Legislature is able to make no matter statutory amendments it could regard as obligatory or helpful. For though it is probably not distinctive for a courtroom to find out {that a} specific phrase or phrase inside a statute carries a which means that deviates from widespread parlance or understanding, such selections can also present discover to legislators that some clarification could also be so as.

Justice Patricia Guerrero would have granted evaluation. Because of Stephen Newman at Stroock for the pointer.